The stadium on the balance sheet

The Premier League's new cost rule leaves stadium spending alone and counts the debt somewhere else. Spurs, Everton, Barcelona and Real Madrid show that what a stadium does to a club depends less on what it cost than on who lent the money, at what rate, and against what.

Tottenham's accounts for the year to 30 June 2025 show financial borrowings of £851.7m and net debt of £831.2m, the legacy of the stadium build, and a loss of £94.7m for the year. The same release explains why the debt worries Spurs less than that headline suggests: over 90% of those borrowings are at fixed rates, the average rate is 3.07%, and the average maturity is 17.6 years. Match receipts came to £126.5m that season, in a building that also earns from the events and the technology this blog has covered before.

Spurs are the benchmark because the cost of the building matters less than the terms of the money that paid for it, and the rules arriving this season make those terms more important.

Where the rules put a stadium

The Premier League's Squad Cost Ratio, whose revenue side this series has covered, counts "player and head coach wages, agents' fees and amortisation or impairment of transfer fees" as squad costs. A stadium appears nowhere in that list. The league says clubs can invest in "off-pitch areas like stadium upgrades and fan experience" without SCR restrictions, and the revenue a stadium brings in does count, including "net profits from non-football events hosted at their stadiums, such as concerts." Under the ratio, a new ground is all upside.

The debt turns up in the other half of the new system. The Sustainability and Systemic Resilience rules include a Positive Equity Test that divides liabilities by adjusted assets and requires the result to be at or below 90% in 2026/27, falling to 80% from 2028/29. All balance-sheet liabilities count, "including shareholder loans and external debt", and the stated aim is to stop clubs operating with "unreasonably high levels of debt." A stadium built on borrowed money adds roughly as much to the liabilities as to the assets, which drags the ratio towards 100% for any club that started below it.

Everton: expensive money first

Everton's new ground at Bramley-Moore Dock was planned at £800m, and spending on it had reached £813.0m by June 2025. Under Farhad Moshiri the build was funded with what Inside World Football calls high-interest "loans secured against rights and media income, MSP Sports Capital, and 777 Partners", the last of which this series met as an owner that broke. The Esk's reading of the stadium company's accounts puts the rights-and-media debt at around 10.5% and the 777 money "certainly in the high teens", though neither rate was ever disclosed.

The Friedkin Group's takeover in December 2024 was followed in March 2025 by a £350m JPMorgan-arranged refinancing that the club said was "oversubscribed multiple times." The same Esk analysis reports it runs thirty years to 30 June 2055 and is secured over the stadium assets. During the build much of the interest never passed through the profit and loss account: £61.2m of borrowing costs were capitalised into the stadium's book value in 2024 and £39.3m in 2025, so the expensive years sit on the balance sheet as part of what the building cost. Everton got Spurs-shaped debt in the end, but only after a change of owner, and they paid the high-interest years first.

Barcelona and Madrid: two ways to pledge the future

Barcelona raised €1.45bn from 20 investors in 2023 "without mortgaging the stadium", to be repaid from Camp Nou revenues the club projects at about €247m a year once the work is finished. What the lenders hold instead is a claim on that income: the fund's filings register its assets as "future credit rights linked to the future operation of the stadium". By 30 June 2026 it had put €1,162.89m into the project, which was about half built, and €127.52m had gone on interest, commissions and costs, with no principal yet repaid. A June 2025 bond refinanced €424m at an average 5.19%, moving repayment to between 2033 and 2050. In September members approved another €300m for the works, lifting the ceiling from €1.5bn to €1.8bn, and €210m of bonds backed by audiovisual rights, on a club with aggregate financial debt of €2.68bn. A stadium financed against its own future revenue has to earn that revenue on schedule, and the Camp Nou is running late.

Real Madrid borrowed earlier and cheaper. The 2019 loan from JPMorgan and Bank of America was €575m over thirty years at a fixed 2.5%, paid as a fixed €29.5m a year from 2023 to 2049. A further €225m followed, and in 2022 the club sold Sixth Street and Legends 30% of the revenue from the stadium's new businesses until 2042 for €360m, money that, unlike a loan, never has to be repaid. Investment in the Bernabéu has reached €1,407.7m, and the club reported operating revenue of €1.221bn for 2025/26, with net debt of €9m once the stadium financing is left out. A year earlier the stadium loan stood at €1,132m, so Madrid owes on its ground roughly what the club takes in a year, and services it from a building that is already open.

Set side by side, what separates the four is what was pledged against the bill and when repayment starts: Spurs and Madrid locked in low fixed rates for decades, Everton paid what were probably double-digit rates until an owner with a bank behind it replaced the lenders, Barcelona is repaying against revenue the building doesn't yet earn, and Madrid also sold part of the upside for cash.

The next one

Manchester United's 100,000-seat stadium is the largest of these projects still to be financed. The club has bought the 25-acre plot beside Old Trafford that it needed to avoid relying on Freightliner's land, and told a fans' forum this year that the stadium will be "entirely privately financed", with conversations under way with investors. It has not said which of these structures it means. Under the new rules the building costs United nothing against the squad and the debt lands in a test that tightens every season until 2028/29, so the question is which kind of lender United finds: a Spurs-style fixed-rate placement, a Madrid-style partner taking a share of the revenue, or a Barcelona-style claim on income the stadium has yet to earn.

No comments yet